The question that is the title of this article arises at a time of profound geopolitical transformation, in which the norms of the previous world order, norms from which we Albanians benefited, are increasingly being disregarded. The world is no longer predictable. Power politics has returned, and security is once again at the center of international affairs. States, regardless of their size, have long been debating internally—politically, academically, and socially—the consequences of this situation.
History shows us that once an order is established, it tends to endure for a certain period. The order that followed World War I lasted two decades; the one established after World War II lasted four decades. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, political scientists such as Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the “end of history” and the triumph of liberal democracy as the final form of governance. Three decades after the end of the Cold War, we are now witnessing the end of that “end of history.” A new world order is taking shape.
Even if its consequences are not yet felt everywhere, the disintegration of the old order is already a bitter reality. And this is precisely where the danger lies, because the effects appear slowly and then escalate with increasing speed. Rivalry over energy, technology, food supply chains, industry, and finance has intensified. Anyone expecting a quick return to normality is wasting precious time. The situation we face resembles a tsunami whose waves are not yet visible.
Defining Characteristics
This transitional period has several defining characteristics. The first is the fracture within the West and the rupture of the trans-Atlantic alliance. The trans-Atlantic bond rested on specific conditions, both globally and within the United States and Europe—and the international context in which that bond flourished is now gone. Victory in World War II and the Cold War enabled the United States to spread liberal norms, first across Western Europe and later to Central and Eastern Europe and beyond.
The established order was never fully liberal, never fully global, and not always orderly. But for a few fortunate decades, it came close enough. Trans-Atlanticism was embedded in this global context and formed its inner circle. Divergences within the trans-Atlantic space never shook the deep sense of mutual belonging that was rooted in the values of freedom, democracy, and international cooperation.
The West remains a valid normative ideal, but at present it no longer exists as a coherent political reality. The American pole remains powerful, though its influence is more limited than in the two decades that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. The international context has changed—and so have the United States and Europe. Trans-Atlanticism as a liberal ideology may be over, but the relationship grounded in common interests is not.
The second characteristic is China’s emergence as a guardian of the world order and the power with the greatest potential to challenge American dominance. The differences between China and the United States are not merely political, military, and ideological; they extend across numerous fields, from technology to major international plans and projects.
The rivalry between the United States and China differs from that between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The Soviet Union was self-isolating, preferring autarky to integration, whereas China’s influence grows steadily today. Ideology marks another difference. Under the Brezhnev Doctrine that governed Central and Eastern Europe, an ally had to be a carbon copy of Soviet-style communism. China, by contrast, is largely agnostic about the internal makeup of other states. It fiercely defends the primacy and superiority of the Chinese Communist Party, but it does not insist that others do the same.
Alongside the features of the early twenty-first century, such as the existence of a single pole, and those of the twentieth century, such as competition between two superpowers, we can today distinguish a third characteristic reminiscent of the nineteenth century: a tacit understanding among the major powers to quietly tolerate violations of international law.
Values, Interests, and Consistency
No matter how small or seemingly insignificant a state may be on the international stage, it needs a foreign-policy strategy—and never more so than in times of transition. Three pillars shape the character of foreign policy: values, interests, and power. All three matter most when the balance and dynamics of the world order are shifting.
In our case, only the first two are truly relevant, since power is a luxury reserved for the big players. They can project military and economic might, compelling smaller actors to align with their objectives. For smaller states, by contrast, it is alliances, partnerships, and smart diplomacy that allow them to exert influence beyond the size of their economies or militaries.
Having been directly involved in the conduct of Albania’s foreign policy during an earlier period, I write with both the conviction and the caution that experience imposes. For Albania, one of the central challenges of foreign policy is preserving coherence and consistency in the values we defend and the interests we pursue, while maintaining our alliances with strategic partners. This is a necessity, especially in uncertain times when points of reference are constantly shifting. If our interests and aspirations form the horizon of foreign policy, then our values, and our consistency in upholding them, should define its boundaries.
During the escalation of the war in Gaza, Albania’s position became ambiguous, betraying both the values it has traditionally promoted and its own earlier commitments. Having previously recognized Palestinian statehood and declared its support for a two-state solution, Albania then abstained on the very resolutions that would have given those positions effect. In May and September 2024, when the General Assembly adopted resolutions on Palestinian statehood, Albania abstained. It did not support the ‘New York Declaration’ issued after the High-Level Conference, nor the resolution of September 12th, 2025, endorsing a two-state solution (Israel/Palestine). It also abstained in the vote of September 19th, 2025, on Palestine’s participation in the work of the UN General Assembly.
Abstaining despite prior recognition and a declared commitment to a two-state solution reinforces the image of a “chameleon” foreign policy, driven by the shifting currents of domestic politics.
Let us be clear: Albania is a small country that does not hold the key to resolving complex conflicts. Even so, maintaining a serious stance and demonstrating strategic clarity is a precondition of any foreign policy. Such matters require a careful balance between the interests and values we have promoted over time and the ability to navigate a world in constant flux.
Navigating Within the Trans-Atlantic Space
The trans-Atlantic rupture is not a good omen for Albania or our region, where, since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the United States has been seen as the guarantor of the security perimeter. On the other hand, Europeans have often been perceived as “allergic” to the use of force. It is well known that the European project itself owes its origins to American support after the end of World War II.
Today, however, disagreements between the United States and the EU are greater than ever. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy reflects this reality, going so far as to describe the EU as contributing to the “erasure of European civilization.”
The same holds true for our region, where the United States is recalibrating its approach. For more than three decades, it played a central role in shaping post-conflict stability across the Western Balkans, investing heavily—through numerous agencies and assistance programs—in democratic governance, judicial reform, and institution-building. Washington is now focusing increasingly on economic cooperation and commercial engagement. This shift is outlined in a May 2026 report to Congress on U.S. policy toward the Western Balkans, which places particular emphasis on trade, infrastructure, and energy cooperation, as well as on the fight against transnational organized crime.
Tellingly, the report makes no mention at all of the region’s EU accession path or of the EU as a partner. The message is unmistakable: Western Balkan governments should no longer expect Washington to play the role it did during the post-conflict decades.
The shape of the new world order, and the place the trans-Atlantic alliance will occupy within it, will be determined in the not-too-distant future. States such as Albania are neither key players nor mere spectators in this equation. Uncertainty is inherent to international relations, especially during transitions from one era to another. What matters is understanding why the change is taking place and how to respond to it. Acting on the basis of our values and interests will give us the room we need to navigate this new era. Our relationship with the United States is irreplaceable. Equally important, however, is ensuring that we do not squander the opportunity for EU membership that the current geopolitical situation has created.
The simultaneous wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, together with the fractures within the trans-Atlantic alliance, have exposed a chameleon-like dimension in our foreign policy. I question the value of proposals to open a dialogue with Putin, given that it was precisely we—as co-penholders with the United States in the UN Security Council on matters relating to Ukraine—who stood out for a critical stance, beyond mere diplomatic language, against Russian aggression in Ukraine. What impact could such a proposal have on our region and on the resolution of statehood-related conflicts? And how serious can it be when key European leaders, criticized until yesterday for their soft approach toward Russia, now stress the need to build a European security architecture against Russian aggression?
Likewise, the urge to differentiate ourselves from other European countries regarding Albania’s presence on the Board of Peace initiated by President Trump is counterproductive. We are where we belong—alongside the United States, whenever our contribution is deemed valuable. In a different format, time, and geopolitical context, we were also part of the U.S.-led coalition in the Iraq War, even when many European allies hesitated or criticized it.
The unsolicited proposal to conduct military operations against Iran from Albanian territory, in the absence of any American military bases here, raises questions about its credibility. It may also be read as a challenge to European allies who, despite hosting American bases, have not answered the U.S. President’s calls.
Interests guide the choices states make. But the proposal above lies well beyond the scope of any contribution we could realistically make. The question that remains unanswered, therefore, is this: what interest do such proposals serve? Our interest is to stand alongside the United States—but to take on such commitments we must also carry a weight that we currently lack.
It is also safe to say that the outcome of the American-Chinese competition will not be decided in Albania. We should therefore avoid any rhetoric that pits these two actors against each other through the prism of Albanian realities. In foreign policy, consistency is an essential component of credibility. Acting seriously and demonstrating strategic clarity is our obligation.
Loss of the Regional Compass
If the preceding concerns are about how Albania positions itself among the great powers, the next are closer to home—and, for that reason, harder to excuse. Equally concerning is the erosion of one of our foreign policy’s main assets: our leverage and political weight among Albanians across the region. This cannot be restored merely by staging nationwide gatherings in Tirana.
Personal relationships meant to sustain a network fossilized by years in power, the instrumentalization of the national interest for the needs of day-to-day politics, and the pointless rivalry—in the absence of cooperation—between Tirana and Pristina for influence among Albanians in the region have significantly weakened the political weight of Albanians, while slowing the advancement of the rights they ought to enjoy.
The energy invested in cultivating good personal relations between the Prime Minister of Albania and the President of Serbia has gone hand in hand with a weakening of the Albanian factor’s leading role in the region. Good relations between Albania and Serbia are important for regional stability. But they cannot be built in disregard of history, geography, and the realities of our region. Albania’s position is hard to understand: on the one hand, it publicly asked the EU “not to pressure Serbia into joining sanctions against Russia,” while on the other, it suspended joint governmental meetings with Kosovo over the restrictive measures the EU had unjustly imposed on it.
It remains unexplained why the Prime Minister’s positions—at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and on the Board of Peace, regarding Kosovo’s Specialist Chambers in The Hague, as well as the resolutions and declarations of the Albanian Parliament—do not correspond to the positions and actions of our foreign policy. Albania has repeatedly joined EU statements at the UN Security Council stressing the “importance and necessity of supporting the work of Kosovo’s Specialist Chambers,” even though this does not fall under the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, against which the EU measures candidate countries’ alignment. It is unclear why domestic policy is not reflected in foreign policy—why even declarations made in international forums are not translated into foreign-policy positions and actions.
The official government position toward the Albanians of North Macedonia is marked at times by paternalism and at others by indifference, accompanied by a lack of sensitivity to the sacrifices Albanians have made to be treated as equals with Macedonians. The 2017 platform of the Albanian political parties in North Macedonia, supported by Albania, was based on advancing Albanian rights and equality with Macedonians. It produced tangible benefits precisely because our foreign policy was focused on objectives tied to the national interest rather than to the political fortunes of particular parties or individuals.
Our needless entanglement in a cycle of exchanges with Bulgaria over its disputes with North Macedonia is now reflected in Bulgaria’s demands on Albania in the enlargement process. We should not be surprised: states conduct diplomacy according to cold calculation.
History and geography are two factors that foreign policy cannot change. No one chooses their neighbors, and for that very reason every effort must be made to coexist with them. Albania needs a high-level, long-term strategy for its relationship with Greece, the most developed of its Balkan neighbors—a strategy grounded in the country’s values and interests, and addressing bilateral issues in their entirety.
With every change of foreign minister, it has become customary to proclaim a “new beginning” in relations with Greece. The bitter truth is that no step has been taken in this direction since 2018. Albania has mistakenly overvalued short-term gains while failing to reckon with the long-term losses.
After a multi-year process of discussion and negotiation, in 2018 we came close to a historic compromise with Greece. I call it historic because all of the unresolved issues between us would have been settled once and for all. Perhaps neither Albania nor Greece was ready for such a compromise at the time. Today the conditions may have matured. What is needed, therefore, are comprehensive, fair, and durable solutions—not the selective handling of individual issues.
Setting out all the issues systematically—issues that go back to Greece’s enactment of the “law of war” against Albania—is always easier than working out acceptable solutions; yet it is a necessary step, one that must precede the definition of a framework for resolving them. To put it differently, we built a process of trust, analyzing mutual interests and the instruments available to us, and mapped out both the means and the timetable for addressing all bilateral issues, including the delimitation of maritime zones, with the aim of reaching a fair outcome.
Although this process was not crowned with an agreement on the delimitation of maritime zones, it achieved something that should not be underestimated: for the first time, the Albanian and Greek negotiating teams found a common language on the technical foundations of any future settlement. That common ground rested on four points: first, the principles on which the delimitation would be based (the straight-line method and the corrections to it for special geographical circumstances); second, the methodology for constructing the delimitation line; third, the incorporation of the Florence Protocol, which defined the land border between Albania and Greece, with Pyramid 79—where the land meets the sea—as the starting point of the future delimitation line; and fourth, reducing the weight given to the islands in the Territorial Sea, the Continental Shelf, and the Exclusive Economic Zone, so as to produce a fair delimitation.
These elements can and should serve as the basis for any future process between the parties. In the meantime, some of the issues in the package were resolved. The settlement on toponyms removed obstacles to the cross-border movement of our citizens. Greece lifted its reservation on the use of the apostille stamp, saving Albanian citizens millions of euros a year on various documents; lifting that reservation also opened the way for our consular offices in Greece to issue certificates, a great relief for our citizens.
Driving licenses were mutually recognized. Work resumed on the revision of textbooks, and on the implementation of the 2009 agreement on the search for, exhumation, identification, and reburial of Greek soldiers who fell in Albania during the Italo-Greek war of 1940 to 1941, as well as on the construction of a resting place for them on Albanian territory.
From this perspective, it would be a mistake to separate the maritime question from the broader package of unresolved issues with Greece. The foreign minister’s announcement that the matter will be referred to an international court within the year risks repeating the mistakes of 2009 if it is done without preparation or preconditions. Hiring foreign law firms is not enough for the country to take a case to an international court.
The case must be properly prepared in light of international case law, the country must have done its “homework,” and it must draw the right conclusions from both the mistakes of 2009 and the achievements of 2018. This is not about shifting responsibility for how the issue is handled; it is about the parties’ genuine willingness to accept the verdict of an international court.
In other words, the country must be able to accomplish three things: to grasp fully the precedents established by the international law of the sea; to develop thoroughly a range of alternative solutions consistent with constitutional jurisprudence; and to formulate a strategy for implementing the most suitable of them.
Strategic Patience
Addressing difficult foreign-policy problems requires strategy, time, and patience. This lesson is not about fatalism or avoiding hard choices. It is about what can be achieved at an acceptable cost to other priorities, both foreign and domestic. Perfection is rarely on the menu in diplomacy, least of all today.
To paraphrase Henry Kissinger, the statesman does not enjoy the analyst’s luxury, for problems are imposed upon him, the time to find the right solution is never sufficient, and a wrong decision is often irreversible. The success of his choices is, in the end, subject to the judgment of history.
