In recent years, the phrase “China-Europe New Cold War” has appeared frequently in discussions among think tanks and opinion circles in European capitals such as Brussels, Berlin, and Paris. Some commentators have conflated the EU’s “de-risking” policies, its industrial and trade barriers, and the politicization of values to paint a picture of bloc-based confrontation and comprehensive decoupling between China and Europe—a narrative that has sparked widespread anxiety within the business communities and general publics on both sides.
It must be acknowledged that China-Europe relations are currently undergoing a period of adjustment; differences and frictions have clearly increased, and the competitive dimension has become increasingly prominent. But differences do not amount to confrontation, and competition certainly does not imply a Cold War.
Situated at opposite ends of the Eurasian continent, China and Europe have no fundamental geopolitical conflict, nor do they face irreconcilable clashes of interest. On the contrary, they share deeply intertwined economic and trade ties, as well as broad common interests in global governance.
This article seeks to set out objectively the actual manifestations of the differences between China and Europe, to analyze the logical flaws in the “New Cold War” narrative, and to propose feasible paths by which both sides might overcome their current predicament. China has consistently maintained strategic patience toward Europe and possesses both the confidence and the capability to manage differences—steering the relationship back toward stability and pragmatism through a process of adjustment and accommodation.
SUBHEAD: How China Sees its Differences With Europe
The narrative of a “China-Europe New Cold War” is not without foundation. Over the past few years, a series of EU policy adjustments across the realms of trade, values, and security have indeed taken on distinct overtones of competition and confrontation. These moves have steadily eroded the foundation of bilateral mutual trust and provided fertile ground for the spread of narratives about bloc-based confrontation. From the perspective of Chinese scholars, these frictions—which bear the hallmarks of a “New Cold War”—encompass at least three key areas.
First, in the economic and trade sphere, “de-risking” has evolved into a set of trade barriers. In 2022, the European Union formally introduced its “de-risking” strategy toward China. Nominally distinct from the U.S. approach of comprehensive “decoupling and severing supply chains”—and emphasizing “reducing dependency rather than cutting ties”—this strategy has, in practice, evolved into a tool for systemic industrial protection and trade restriction, erecting multi-dimensional economic and trade barriers against China.
An example is the substantive implementation of the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). As a core policy instrument of the EU’s green transition, the CBAM entered a transitional phase in October 2023 and began its levy stage in January 2026, covering six high-carbon sectors: cement, iron and steel, aluminum, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen. The rules for calculating embedded emissions, released by the EU in December 2025, further refined the accounting standards and expanded the scope of downstream products covered. China is one of the EU’s largest sources of iron, steel, and aluminum imports; industry estimates suggest that, once the CBAM is fully implemented, the export costs for the relevant Chinese products to Europe will rise by approximately 30 percent. While ostensibly designed to address climate change, the mechanism effectively functions as a green trade barrier, imposing additional compliance costs on Chinese enterprises.
Another example is the frequent use of trade-remedy and industrial-investigation tools. Following the entry into force of the EU’s Foreign Subsidies Regulation (FSR), China’s new-energy industry became a primary target for scrutiny. In October 2023, the EU formally launched an anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese-made battery electric vehicles (BEVs). A final ruling, issued in October 2024, imposed anti-subsidy duties of 17.0 percent, 18.8 percent, and 35.3 percent on BYD, Geely, and SAIC respectively, with a uniform rate of 20.7 percent applied to other cooperating companies. Although subsequent negotiations led to a “price undertaking” mechanism that partially substituted for the high tariffs, the case nonetheless set a precedent for large-scale EU trade investigations into China’s strategic emerging industries. Meanwhile, the EU’s Net-Zero Industry Act introduces local-content requirements for eight key net-zero industries—including batteries, photovoltaics, and hydrogen—effectively compelling Chinese enterprises to invest and establish factories within the EU. Failure to do so would bar them from participating in EU public procurement and subsidy programs; in essence, this constitutes an administrative push to shift supply chains.
There are, furthermore, implicit exclusionary practices in public procurement and the technology sector. In areas such as 5G, digital infrastructure, and energy projects, several EU Member States have restricted Chinese companies from bidding, citing “national security” concerns. Certain Central and Eastern European nations have aligned with the U.S. position, excluding companies such as Huawei and ZTE from core telecommunications infrastructure. Amendments to the EU’s cybersecurity directives have expanded the definition of “high-risk vendors,” further squeezing the market space available to Chinese tech firms in Europe.
Second, in the realm of values, the politicization of issues has eroded the foundation of mutual trust. Infusing economic and trade issues with ideological values and internationalizing domestic affairs have become hallmarks of Europe’s recent policy toward China; the issue of Xinjiang, in particular, has served as a central instrument of Europe’s “values-based diplomacy.”
In November 2024, the Council of the European Union formally adopted the Regulation on Prohibiting Products Made with Forced Labour on the Union Market. Set for full implementation in December 2027, the regulation bans products made using “forced labor” from entering the EU market, covering all industries and supply chains. Although it does not explicitly name China, official EU documents and public discourse repeatedly designate Xinjiang as a “high-risk region,” making clear who the target of the measure is. As the European Commission has released implementation guidelines and risk databases throughout 2025, it has singled out sectors in which China holds a competitive advantage—such as photovoltaics, textiles, electronics, and automotive manufacturing—for priority scrutiny, thereby pressuring European companies to conduct supply-chain reviews aimed at “de-linking” from Xinjiang.
Concurrently, the European Parliament has continued to pass political resolutions concerning Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Between 2024 and 2025 alone, the Parliament adopted two reports on Xinjiang; lacking concrete factual evidence, these reports constructed narratives of “human rights issues” and called on the EU to implement further targeted measures. Some Members of the European Parliament frequently make provocative visits to the Taiwan region, challenging the one-China principle and grossly interfering in China’s internal affairs. Such political maneuvers constantly stoke perceptual antagonism, holding China-EU relations hostage to questions of values and causing them to veer away from the primary track of pragmatic cooperation.
Third, in the security domain, the expansion of security discourse has shifted the EU’s strategic positioning toward China. As early as 2019, in its ‘EU-China: A Strategic Outlook,’ the European Commission characterized China through a tripartite framework: partner, economic competitor, and systemic rival. This marked the first time the EU had designated China a “systemic rival,” extending security discourse into non-traditional areas such as technology, the economy, and supply chains.
Since then, the EU has steadily broadened the scope of its security policy toward China. In the technology sector, it has followed the U.S. lead on semiconductor export controls—restricting the export of certain high-end lithography equipment and EDA software to China—thereby transforming China-EU technological competition into a conflict characterized by entrenched rules, systemic rivalry, and long-term friction, and making it a primary area of disagreement. With regards to Indo-Pacific, the EU released its ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’ which supported strengthening security cooperation and conducting joint military exercises with Japan, South Korea, and Australia—moves clearly intended to counterbalance China. In the military realm, EU Member States have gradually expanded their exports of arms-related components to Taiwan and stepped up unofficial military exchanges with the region.
Collectively, these policies paint a picture of the EU making a systemic shift toward confrontation with China, providing fertile ground for narratives about a “New Cold War.” It is crucial to recognize, however, that these differences are essentially a mix of interest-based bargaining, perceptual disparity, and policy adjustment, rather than a Cold War-style, all-out confrontation between blocs. Many European policies are reactive responses to China’s industrial rise, driven by a complex interplay of factors—including internal political maneuvering and U.S. pressure—rather than resting on rational strategic judgment alone.
SUBHEAD: An Exaggerated Narrative
Despite the objective existence of these differences, an analysis of structural factors, the foundation of shared interests, and the balance of power reveals that a so-called “New Cold War” between China and Europe neither aligns with the fundamental interests of either side nor possesses the realistic conditions required to materialize. The core characteristics of the Cold War were economic decoupling, market fragmentation, and bloc confrontation. China and Europe, by contrast, have long established a pattern of deeply intertwined interests—a state of mutual integration—which stands as a reality that narratives of confrontation struggle to overcome.
According to Chinese customs statistics, the total volume of China’s imports and exports with the EU reached CN¥5.93 trillion in 2025, a year-on-year increase of 6 percent, accounting for approximately 13 percent of China’s total foreign trade; the EU has for years maintained its position as China’s second-largest trading partner. Data from the European side shows that trade with China accounts for about 15 percent of the EU’s total import and export value, making China the EU’s second-largest trading partner as well. So massive a volume of trade cannot easily be severed by mere political rhetoric.
This interdependence becomes even more apparent at the level of specific countries and industries. Germany is China’s largest trading partner in Europe; in 2025, bilateral trade between the two reached approximately CN¥1.51 trillion. Mechanical and electrical products accounted for 70.8 percent of this total, with trade in automobiles and auto parts alone amounting to CN¥131.5 billion. For the three major German automakers—Volkswagen, BMW, and Mercedes-Benz—sales in China each account for around 25 percent of total global sales, making the Chinese market a core source of their global profits.
Furthermore, the chemical giant BASF’s €10 billion investment in its Zhanjiang integrated production base represents the largest single investment by a German company in China, underscoring the long-term confidence European industry places in the Chinese market. In the consumer-goods sector, the EU is China’s largest source of imports; imports from the EU—including luggage and bags, healthcare products, passenger vehicles, and cosmetics—each account for over 40 percent of China’s total imports in their respective categories.
For luxury groups such as France’s LVMH and Kering, meanwhile, the Chinese market contributes roughly one-third of global revenue. Beyond trade, the industrial and supply chains of China and Europe are deeply intertwined. Europe’s high-end equipment, precision instruments, and core components serve as vital pillars for the upgrading of China’s manufacturing sector; conversely, China’s mid-to-low-end manufacturing, new-energy products, and comprehensive supply-chain systems provide a crucial guarantee for Europe’s price stability and green transition. Data shows that 98 percent of the solar panels imported by Europe come from China, as do over 80 percent of its energy-storage product imports.
Severing supply-chain ties with China would raise the cost of Europe’s energy transition by at least 30 percent and lead to a sharp rise in residential electricity prices. Furthermore, as of the first half of 2026, the cumulative number of China-Europe freight-train trips had surpassed 130,000, carrying goods valued at over $520 billion; these trains have become a major logistics artery connecting the Eurasian continent, driving double-digit growth in trade between China and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe for years.
Another core premise of the Cold War was geostrategic confrontation and a standoff between military blocs—a foundation entirely absent in the relationship between China and Europe. Geographically, China and Europe sit at opposite ends of the Eurasian continent, separated by thousands of kilometers, with no territorial or border disputes between them. As for strategic focus, Europe’s core security concerns center on Eastern Europe, where the Russia-Ukraine conflict directly affects its geopolitical and energy security; China’s core security concerns center on the Asia-Pacific, its primary goals being the preservation of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the maintenance of peace and stability in its neighborhood. The strategic priorities of the two sides are essentially misaligned, which precludes any direct struggle for geopolitical power.
From a military perspective, China adheres to a policy of non-alignment; it has neither established military alliances in Europe’s vicinity nor deployed military forces within Europe. While Europe forms the backbone of NATO, the alliance’s core function is collective defense, and its expansion into the Asia-Pacific is driven primarily by the United States; most European nations are unwilling to transform NATO into a military instrument for confronting China. China has never viewed Europe as a security threat, nor can Europe define China as a direct military adversary—a situation fundamentally different from the tense standoff between the U.S. and Soviet military blocs during the Cold War.
Moreover, a Cold War scenario requires a high degree of unified will and coordinated action within a bloc; yet the deep divisions within the EU over policy toward China make it fundamentally impossible to form a unified ‘Cold War front’ against the country. To begin with, there is a divergence of positions among Member States. Hungary has long been a proponent of pragmatic cooperation with China within the EU; it has exercised its veto on three separate occasions to block EU statements on Hong Kong—which it viewed as interference in China’s internal affairs—and has described EU sanctions against China as “meaningless, arrogant, and harmful.” Even after the change of government in 2026, the new administration has clearly welcomed Chinese investment and expressed a desire to deepen cooperation with companies such as BYD and CATL, while emphasizing that such efforts must proceed within a framework of regulatory compliance. Serbia, an EU candidate country, has consistently maintained a friendly stance toward China and firmly supports China’s position on core issues.
Positions are inconsistent even among the key Western European nations. The German business community strongly opposes decoupling from China; and while the German government has proposed “de-risking,” it consistently emphasizes “no decoupling, no confrontation” and maintains a high-level communication with China. France places greater emphasis on European strategic autonomy, advocating independence in its China policy and showing reluctance to align fully with the U.S. strategy of containment. Only a few small Northern and Central-Eastern European nations—driven by security and ideological considerations—favor a tougher stance toward China; but given their small economic size and limited political influence, they are unable to dictate the EU’s overall policy.
There are, furthermore, clear divisions among the EU institutions themselves. Driven by electoral politics, the European Parliament tends to pass hardline resolutions on China to cater to populist sentiment; the European Commission is relatively pragmatic, prioritizing the EU’s industrial interests and global competitiveness; and the European Council largely reflects the collective position of the Member States, generally leaning toward caution. This multi-level, multi-actor dynamic causes the EU’s China policy to oscillate constantly between a hardline stance and pragmatism, making it difficult to establish a consistent, unified strategy of confrontation.
China’s own development strength and strategic resolve serve as a further safeguard against China-EU relations sliding into a Cold War. China possesses the resilience and the confidence to navigate Europe’s policy adjustments; it will not alter its development trajectory under external pressure, nor will it initiate confrontation.
In terms of economic scale, China’s GDP stood at approximately $19.6 trillion in 2025, firmly securing its position as the world’s second-largest economy, backed by a vast market of 1.4 billion people and a middle-income group exceeding 400 million. Domestic demand has become the primary engine of China’s economic growth, and the economy’s reliance on foreign trade has steadily declined, enabling it to withstand the impact of external trade frictions effectively.
In terms of industrial strength, China has established a globally competitive edge in emerging sectors such as new energy and artificial intelligence. In 2025, China’s production and sales of new-energy vehicles both exceeded 16 million units—ranking first globally for the eleventh consecutive year and accounting for over 60 percent of total global output. Solar-cell production reached 832.743 million kilowatts, representing more than 80 percent of the global total, while CATL’s global market share for power batteries reached 39.2 percent, holding the top spot for the ninth consecutive year. In the AI sector, the scale of China’s core AI industry surpassed CN¥1.2 trillion in 2025, with over 6,200 enterprises; total intelligent computing capacity reached 1,590 EFLOPS, and industrial-robot production hit 773,000 units—figures that place China far ahead of Europe. These industrial advantages make it difficult for Europe’s “de-risking” policy to achieve its intended effect, and may, on the contrary, drive-up Europe’s own transformation costs.
More important still, China’s policy toward Europe has remained consistent and stable. China consistently regards Europe as a key partner and adheres to an open strategy of mutual benefit; it will not alter the overall direction of cooperation simply because of policy fluctuations in Europe. This strategic resolve acts as a stabilizing force for China-EU relations.
SUBHEAD: Breaking the Impasse: The Future Path for China-EU Relations
To break the current impasse, China-EU relations can rely neither on unilateral concession nor on the dominance of confrontational narratives. Instead, both sides must work together to return to a rational and pragmatic approach, and to rebuild the foundation of mutual trust.
The root causes of many of the differences between China and the EU lie in cognitive bias and discursive misunderstanding. Certain European elites have long harbored a sense of civilizational superiority, habitually judging China against their own value standards and institutional models, while holding deep-seated stereotypes about China’s development path and governance model.
Europe should abandon its condescending, preachy attitude and learn to view China as an equal. Take industrial policy. Many Europeans attribute the rise of China’s new-energy sector to “unfair subsidies.” In reality, the competitiveness of China’s photovoltaic and electric-vehicle industries stems from comprehensive supply-chain ecosystems, intense market competition, continuous technological innovation, and a vast pool of skilled engineering talent—all outcomes achieved through market-based competition. The EU’s initiation of anti-subsidy investigations into Chinese electric vehicles overlooks the tax incentives and market-access privileges that European automakers have long enjoyed in China. Double standards only deepen antagonism; only dialogue grounded in equality can resolve problems.
China, for its part, should better understand Europe’s anxieties and concerns. Europe faces immense competitive pressure during its green transition and industrial upgrading, and its worries about supply-chain security and industrial sovereignty are grounded in fact. China can address Europe’s legitimate concerns by further opening its market, improving the business environment, and strengthening intellectual-property protection. The plan to further shorten the negative list for foreign-investment access in 2025—opening up the manufacturing and service sectors—sends a positive signal to global investors, Europe’s included.
In recent years, owing to the pandemic and to political factors, people-to-people exchanges between China and Europe have contracted sharply, with a marked decline in scholarly visits, youth exchanges, and grassroots dialogue. When face-to-face communication is cut off, extreme opinion easily comes to dominate the narrative landscape, allowing misunderstanding and prejudice to accumulate. Rebuilding the bonds of people-to-people exchange is the social foundation for any warming of China-Europe relations.
Priority should be given to restoring educational and academic exchange. Before the pandemic, there were over 250,000 Chinese students in Europe and more than 100,000 European students in China; such two-way exchange is vital to fostering mutual understanding. While the numbers have been recovering gradually since 2025, they have yet to return to pre-pandemic levels. Both sides should streamline visa procedures, expand scholarship programs, and encourage more reciprocal visits by young students. At the same time, mechanisms for think-tank exchange should be relaunched: this means supporting European scholars in conducting field research in China and encouraging Chinese scholars to engage in academic dialogue in Europe, so that objective research may counter one-sided public narratives.
Cooperation at the local and sectoral levels is another key lever. China and the nations of Europe have established over 1,000 pairs of sister cities, and projects such as the China-Germany Eco-Park, the China-France Wuhan Ecological Demonstration City, and the China-Netherlands AI Industry Cooperation Park stand as exemplary models of practical cooperation at the local level. Both sides should support more provinces and cities in establishing sister-city ties and engage in tangible cooperation in areas such as green and low-carbon development, smart cities, and healthcare. Thus, ensuring that the fruits of this cooperation reach ordinary people.
The Russia-Ukraine conflict is one of the most significant points of divergence between China and Europe—and a critical variable affecting bilateral political trust. Europe generally views the conflict as a direct threat to its own security, which has produced intense collective anxiety; China, meanwhile, maintains an objective and neutral stance, committed to facilitating peace talks and promoting a political resolution. Differences of position exist, but they need not escalate into total confrontation.
China’s position rests on clear logic and principle: upholding respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations and adhering to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter; opposing actions that add fuel to the fire or drive an endless escalation of the conflict; and advocating the resolution of disputes through dialogue and negotiation, while promoting the construction of a balanced, effective, and sustainable European security architecture. Since the outbreak of the conflict, Li Hui, China’s Special Representative for Eurasian Affairs, has engaged in multiple rounds of shuttle diplomacy—visiting Russia, Ukraine, France, Germany, EU headquarters, and various Global South nations to coordinate positions and press for a ceasefire. China has also co-initiated, with Brazil, the “Friends of Peace” group on the Ukraine crisis, rallying the Global South in support of peace. These efforts demonstrate that China is neither a bystander nor an instigator, but an active mediator for peace.
China and Europe should establish a dedicated dialogue mechanism on the Russia-Ukraine conflict, to exchange views and concerns regularly and to manage differences of perception. Europe should neither demand that China take sides nor equate China’s neutral stance with support for Russia. China’s neutrality is, in fact, a valuable asset for advancing peace negotiations. This would allow the two sides to find common ground and cooperate on practical terms in areas such as humanitarian aid, post-war reconstruction, and food security.
A potential trilateral meeting among China, the U.S., and Russia—likely to take place at the 2026 APEC summit in Shenzhen—would be a significant event in the current Eurasian geopolitical landscape, with external implications for China-Europe relations. The core agenda of such a meeting would focus on global issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, Eurasian security, and the de-escalation of regional conflicts. Fundamentally, it would constitute strategic communication between major powers to manage risk and avoid miscalculation, rather than the formation of a bloc directed against Europe. Sustained dialogue among major powers generally helps reduce the risk of global conflict and aligns with Europe’s own security interests.
For Europe, the priority is to uphold its strategic autonomy and avoid being drawn into bloc-based confrontations between major powers. Europe should not passively choose sides between China and the U.S., but should instead formulate its China policy independently, on the basis of its own interests. It can cooperate extensively with China in areas such as climate governance, global economic governance, and the reform of the multilateral trading system, while maintaining dialogue on matters where differences exist, such as security and values. True strategic autonomy does not mean leaning to one side; it means maintaining independent judgment and safeguarding one’s core interests amid the interplay of the major powers.
China-EU relations are currently in a critical period of adjustment. While difference and competition are objective realities, to frame the situation as a “New Cold War” is both a misreading of history and a misjudgment of the present. The essence of the Cold War lay in bloc confrontation, comprehensive decoupling, and zero-sum competition—scenarios for which neither China nor the EU has the desire or the conditions. Deeply intertwined economic and trade interests, divergent strategic concerns, internal divisions within Europe, and China’s robust resilience serve collectively as a “breakwater” for the China-EU relationship.
China remains a partner for Europe’s peace and development, not an adversary. It is confident in its ability to manage differences with Europe, and patient in its efforts to steer the relationship back onto the right track. As key representatives of Eastern and Western civilization, and as two of the world’s major economies, China and Europe bear a responsibility to forge a new path of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation between nations of different systems and at different stages of development. The path will not be smooth. Friction and setbacks are inevitable. However, provided that both sides uphold mutual respect and equal dialogue, manage their differences, and expand their cooperation, the China-EU relationship will surely overcome its current difficulties—and inject greater certainty into a turbulent world.
