Since 2020, the African continent has absorbed four overlapping shocks. These shocks include the Covid-19 crisis, a Ukraine and now Iran-driven inflation spike accompanied by risk of commodity supply shortages, a prolonged era of high interest rates, and the decrease, if not withdrawal, of vital development aid programs. At the same time, Africa is contending with accelerating climate impacts, from coastal erosion in the Gulf of Guinea to multi-year droughts in the Horn. Many states remain in a fragile posture, struggling to meet the basic needs of a rising number of climate-displaced populations.
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are meanwhile increasingly viewed as a distant horizon. The fight against poverty, in particular, has hit a wall. While the continent’s poverty rate fell from 56 percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2019, the post-pandemic recovery has been sluggish. By mid-2025, the World Bank’s revised metrics—adjusting the international poverty line to $3.00 (2021 PPP)—revealed a sobering reality: globally, roughly 808 million people now live in extreme poverty, and Sub-Saharan Africa accounts for approximately 73 percent of that total.
Geopolitical heavyweights like Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt continue to face structural headwinds, though the continent’s overall growth has shown signs of a modest rebound, estimated at around 4 percent in 2025 and projected at 4.3 percent for 2026. While an improvement, this remains insufficient to outpace a 2.5 percent demographic growth rate or to decisively move the needle on poverty. To be sure, trajectories vary: commodity exporters have found some relief in price pressures, and West African economies have shown remarkable resilience, even as the implementation of the EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)—now in its definitive phase as of January 2026—imposes new costs on African industrial exports.
These shocks have amplified existing vulnerabilities, including the expansion of the “gray economy” and persistent security threats. Structural hurdles remain: intra-African trade is still hindered by a lack of cross-border infrastructure despite the AfCFTA’s move toward coordinated execution. Tax collection remains stagnant at an average of 16.6 percent, and local agricultural yields are still failing to keep pace with demand. While FDI hit a record $97 billion in 2024—inflated by a single Egyptian mega-project—UNCTAD projected, in its “World Investment Report 2025,” a sharp correction to approximately $56 to $59 billion in 2025, highlighting a continued dependence on a few large-scale projects and a persistent “risk premium” that keeps private capital on the sidelines. The weighted cost of capital for a solar power project in the region is much higher than in Europe for example.
Crucially, these crises have solidified the “North-South” divide. Africa, now holding a permanent seat at the G20 through the African Union, increasingly rejects being a passive victim of the confrontation between “the West” and the Russia-China bloc. These divergences are most visible in climate governance. Following COP30 in Belém, the debate has shifted from mere “ambition” to the “Baku-to-Belém Roadmap,” with Southern countries demanding that the $1.3 trillion annual climate finance target be met with grants and concessional tools rather than further debt.
The 2023 Summit for a New Global Financial Pact in Paris served as a catalyst, but by 2026, the frustration in African capitals is palpable as many promises remain unfulfilled. While the IMF’s Resilience and Sustainability Fund and the World Bank’s reforms have provided some liquidity, the effectiveness of these funds is not yet commensurate with the scale of the challenge. The “cost of greening”—specifically the need for subsidized decarbonization of inputs like cement and steel for Africa’s surging urban centers—remains a glaring omission in the global architecture.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Strategic Giant, Marginal Footprint
While Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 15 percent of the world’s population in 2021, it is on track to represent 25 percent by 2050, driving half of all global population growth between 2020 and mid-century. Despite this, its share of global energy demand, generation, and greenhouse gas emissions remains marginal. With a population that has now surpassed 1.3 billion—70 percent of whom are under 30 years of age—and heading toward 2 billion by 2050, 60 percent of people now live in urban areas. Yet, the challenges remain staggering: more than 600 million people still have no access to electricity, and nearly 1 billion are without access to clean cooking.
Seen from the continent in early 2026, the energy transition—a central issue in European politics and public opinion—seems fundamentally out of step with the urgent African need for access to firm and competitive energy, centralized and decentralized, development and adaptation. It is impossible to mobilize finance from European Development finance institutions for projects involving natural gas, which several countries are pushing for in combination with renewable energy sources. While the U.S. has stopped development aid, it is supporting the ‘all of the above’ energy agenda welcomed by most governments in the region and the World Bank is embracing gas again.
Governments are striving to develop or strengthen infrastructure, particularly for landlocked countries such as Uganda, Niger, and Rwanda, or semi-landlocked nations like the Democratic Republic of Congo, all of which face high additional costs to lift their populations out of poverty and access global markets. They are working to improve access to energy and clean cooking, with Kenya leading the field followed by Senegal, while South Africa continues to navigate the legacy of its universal access efforts from previous decades. The focus remains on protecting against climate disruptions and developing local employment for the millions of young people entering the job market every year.
Because these countries have emitted very little CO2 since the pre-industrial era, and given their extremely young populations, the official message from African countries remains clear in 2026: polluting states must reduce their emissions more quickly and pay for the adaptation efforts of African countries. African leaders are calling for China to review its lending strategies and for the West to reexamine its legal and democratic conditionalities. For many, a “pure and perfect” taxonomy is a matter for developed Europeans. The African Union has clearly stated that gas is a transition energy in its own right and has defined a common position emphasizing development, an inclusive energy transition, and the diversity of trajectories.
Some observers consider that the energy and climate models for 2030 and 2050 used to anticipate global trajectories actually intend to keep Africa in a state of underdevelopment—particularly regarding electricity use per capita—in order to limit its emissions. The parameters used in these Western models are perceived as biased, devoting too much importance to renewables or mitigation efforts while failing to take account of Africa’s specificities and structural realities. This is increasingly viewed as a way for Westerners to hoard a disproportionate share of global emission stocks.
Wherever possible and profitable, low-carbon technologies are gaining ground and will continue to do so because they are appropriate, accessible, and competitive, provided they are effectively de-risked. Kenya’s ambition is to reach 100 gigawatts of capacity by deploying renewable energy, while Senegal’s ambition is to increase the share of renewable energy in its electricity system to 40 percent by 2030—supported by funding from its Just Energy Transition Partnership. In another example, Mauritania intends to become a leader in both renewable energies and hydrogen and is currently attracting significant international investors as its pilot projects move into the implementation phase. South Africa could become a renewable giant if only grids and governance would improve. A major driver of larger centralized power generation investment currently is the mining sector in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Some African countries are relaunching hydrocarbon exploration and production campaigns. Export opportunities for hydrogen, derivative products, metals, and other raw materials are attracting a great deal of interest. Their ambitions are now greater, and local/national value chains need to be developed as a first step. As one regional official put it: “Why content ourselves with exporting hydrogen to Germany and not capturing more local added value?” Another demand is now clearly formulated: to turn the page on development aid, perceived as prescriptive, and to build partnerships between equals, that are mutually beneficial, and above all, tangible and quick to implement given the social emergency. Industrializing, moving up the value chain and developing more jobs and local value requires improved governance and lower risk premiums.
For Europeans, the strategic calculus regarding Africa has become increasingly urgent in early 2026. Bilateral trade remains starkly unbalanced: Africa directs 30 percent of its exports to Europe yet receives only a fraction of a percent of European exports in return—a dependency that Europe has largely failed to leverage. The geo-economic and geopolitical importance of the region is now heightened by the escalating consequences of climate change—specifically regarding stability, security, and migratory pressures—and the critical raw materials required for the ongoing energy and digital transitions. Accelerating Europe’s own energy transition now demands a level of interdependence with African partners that was previously underestimated, encompassing everything from ports and export terminals to electrical and digital subsea cables, mines, rail, and electrical infrastructure.
Despite these clear interests, Europe’s position on the continent is gradually but undeniably eroding, exacerbated by growing misunderstandings. Europeans were the primary partners to mobilize effectively on vaccine distribution during the Covid-19 pandemic, while simultaneously suspending public debt repayments. They also played a pivotal role—alongside Turkish support and the United Nations—in securing the historic agreements for the export of Black Sea cereals.
Yet, European capitals remain unsettled by the positions taken by various African countries regarding the protracted conflict in Ukraine. There is a profound sense of shock that Moscow’s narrative—which blames Western sanctions for food and energy volatility—could take hold so effectively. To date, Europeans have been unable to counter this disinformation with a compelling alternative narrative. A stark illustration of this failure is the persistent development of anti-European sentiment in Francophone Africa and the visible support for Russian presence in cities across Mali and the Central African Republic following the withdrawal of French and regional security forces.
Furthermore, the debt accumulation of certain states toward China underscores both the imperative of engaging with Beijing—as seen during the sessions on the new financial pact—and the urgent need to offer viable Western alternatives. The benefits of Chinese partnerships are increasingly questioned in African capitals, yet the lack of immediate options remains a primary driver of the shift East. Beyond China, the heavy reliance on foreign currency bond issues, notably Eurobonds, has become one of the most significant contributors to the continent’s current indebtedness and fiscal vulnerability.
This economic fragility makes the Europe-Africa relationship exceptionally delicate. Many African governments take deep offense at Europe’s economic taxonomy—particularly the restrictions placed on gas, oil, and nuclear power investments. At the same time, some administrations maintain close ties with China and Russia while denouncing what they characterize as an imperialism of values related to democratic conditionalities and human rights.
The accusation of European duplicity and double standards—particularly concerning the return to coal in Europe during previous energy crunches or the weight of bureaucratic red tape compared to Chinese players—is a recurring theme in 2026. Most worrying for European policymakers is that governance in several key nations shows no sign of improvement and, in some cases, is in serious decline. This is evidenced by the wave of coups and the precedent of constitutional maneuvering, such as the third-mandate debates that were clarified in Senegal in 2024, or the rise of dynastic successions.
These political shifts occur at a moment when massive investments are most critically needed to combat real climate threats. There is a growing fear in Brussels that large-scale disbursements from major global funds may be vulnerable to misappropriation—an outcome that would fundamentally undermine the essential concept of North-South solidarity that underpins the entire strategic partnership.
Europeans remain deeply preoccupied with the management of migratory flows. A concern that has stayed at the forefront of the political agenda through the early 2026 election cycles. This focus has led to a persistent push for bilateral agreements with North African nations aimed at securing borders within the Frontex framework. Yet, the demographic reality remains that Europe has an increasingly aging population. The need for skilled labor, specifically to drive the complex requirements of the energy transition, is immense, and bridges will inevitably have to be built between Africa and Europe.
These partnerships must go beyond simple labor extraction; they should help train the skilled workforce that Africa also needs for its own industrial development. Consequently, supporting efforts to create millions of jobs in Africa as quickly as possible should be recognized as a primary European security and economic priority.
This financial reality represents an opportunity that must be seized. In the new geopolitical and geo-economic context of early 2026, the old approaches—based on laissez-faire, pressure, sanctions, patronage, and conditionality—all now appear counter-productive. Europeans have already begun to change their strategy, notably through revised trade agreements, infrastructure support via the Global Gateway, and Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETP) designed for the closure of coal-fired power plants. These initiatives, along with bilateral raw material partnerships and improved access to capital, show that progress is being made in taking full account of local needs and constraints. As we move forward, the relationship between the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa must continue to evolve away from the traditional donor-recipient model toward a strategic partnership based on mutual interest and shared resilience.
The Challenges of a New Approach
The landscape of hydrocarbons is ever shifting, where new oil projects across Sub-Saharan Africa are currently serving to slow the long-term decline in the continent’s production, which fell from 9.7 million barrels per day in 2012 to approximately 6.8 million barrels per day by early 2026. This output represents less than 8 percent of the world’s total, and the memory of the 2015 to 2022 price volatility—which plunged many producers into fiscal crisis—remains fresh.
However, a new map of producers and exporters has emerged, featuring Mozambique with its massive offshore liquefied natural gas export potential, Tanzania’s advancing LNG infrastructure, and the world-class oil and gas discoveries in Namibia’s Orange Basin. Other key players include South Africa’s increasingly viable offshore prospects, Senegal and Mauritania, where offshore LNG production successfully ramped up over the last eighteen months, and emerging developments in Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Congo-Brazzaville, and Uganda.
Several preliminary observations define this landscape in 2026. First, there will be no major resurgence in African oil output to the peaks of previous decades. New projects are expected to boost production by roughly 1 million barrels per day over the next few years, reaching 2.5 million barrels per day during the 2030s, yet this remains below the levels achieved in the early 2000s. In contrast, natural gas is expanding significantly, with production projected to rise substantially by 2030 and requiring average annual investments of up to $20 billion. There is an undeniable race as governments press operators to move quickly to secure national benefits before the global energy window shifts.
Second, the oil and gas sector, alongside mining, continues to attract the bulk of foreign direct investment in the region, with figures reaching nearly $38 billion in the last year. European majors, despite mounting domestic pressure, are working to strengthen local contracts further, with project budgets generating billions of dollars in local contracts. These companies are striving to reduce their environmental footprint and strengthen socioeconomic development in their operating regions, driven by the need for societal acceptability and pressure from local authorities.
For the first time, a growing share of these resources is being directed toward local markets, where gas now fuels power plants and industrial hubs, replacing coal and diesel generators. This domestic-first logic also applies to oil, as producers seek to develop refining capacity—most notably in Nigeria and Uganda—to capture more value and reduce the heavy dependence on imported refined products. However, traditional friction points remain, particularly regarding local tax burdens and the requirement to use partners closely aligned with national decision-makers.
Third, the financing of oil and coal projects has become increasingly difficult as European banks retreat under green mandates, yet gas financing remains viable, albeit progressively more constrained. By contrast, banks from Asia, the Middle East, and South Africa face few, if any, of these barriers, leading to a significant shift in the capital stack. Listed major European investors are no longer in a dominant position, now accounting for only 31 percent of investments. They have been largely overtaken by national oil companies, certain Asian firms that do not adhere to the same ESG or IFC standards, and smaller, less accountable players. As American firms have divested from various African assets, Indian and Chinese players have stepped in, often operating with far less public scrutiny and political exposure than their European predecessors.
Rejecting hydrocarbons without offering a credible, effective alternative is bound to fail and would further undermine Europe’s credibility on the continent. Preventing their exploitation would also deprive Europeans of an opportunity to remain engaged and influential in Africa’s development. The choice is not black-and-white: should Europeans abandon the sector entirely, ceding the ground to less scrupulous actors from emerging economies? From a European perspective, it is naïve to believe these projects will not proceed or that low-carbon alternatives can replace them overnight.
From an African perspective, efforts to ban hydrocarbons are frequently viewed as neo-colonial, depriving states of mobilizable revenue. Cooperation with European actors is often seen as a guarantee of quality and a strategic asset. The real issue is maximizing the benefits of hydrocarbons while limiting their scale and duration and accelerating the parallel development of complementary low-carbon systems. Over time, market forces should allow these sustainable solutions to predominate as economic growth strengthens national tax revenues and institutional capacity.
Development of Electrical Sectors
Population growth continues to outpace improvements in electricity access, remaining a fundamental structural challenge across much of Sub-Saharan Africa in early 2026. More than 600 million people in the region still lack basic access to power, and even where connections exist, the service is frequently inadequate. Nearly 1 billion people—approximately 80 percent of the Sub-Saharan African population—remain without access to clean cooking solutions.
The consequences are as predictable as they are devastating: entrenched gender inequality, widespread environmental destruction, premature death from indoor air pollution, and a state of persistent underdevelopment. Despite countless strategies and repeated estimates that the required investment is about $250 billion, the narrative is often dominated by disillusioned commentary. Yet, amidst this frustration, several critical observations define the current landscape.
A significant realization is that major progress is indeed possible, as demonstrated by the advances in energy access and clean cooking within South Africa, Rwanda, Ghana, Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Senegal. These experiences prove that breakthroughs occur when political will is paired with strategic, sustained support. Furthermore, it is possible to break the vicious circle that has historically plagued publicly owned and heavily indebted utility companies. In too many instances, these utilities can no longer maintain infrastructure, leading wealthier customers to disconnect from the network in favor of private solutions.
When governments siphon resources from national companies, utilities often respond by charging prohibitive rates that drive even more customers away. While international financial institutions frequently insist on restructuring and privatization as the only remedy, the emerging reality suggests a more nuanced path.
Hybrid systems are increasingly being deployed, especially in surging urban areas, by combining decentralized solutions like solar panels and generators with centralized systems. In Nigeria, the capacity of private generators is now estimated at 85 gigawatts, dwarfing the 10 gigawatts intermittently available on the public grid. More broadly, decentralized units are currently adding more capacity than centralized generation sources in many contexts, signaling a fundamental shift in how the continent powers itself. Crucially, the private sector has shown a clear willingness to invest.
Telecom companies are leveraging mobile payment and pay-as-you-go systems to provide solar kits and mini-credit, while also expressing interest in corporate power purchase agreements and utility-scale solar plants. However, the primary obstacles continue to be the high level of risk, insurance costs, the absence of reliable land registries, and the high costs of maintaining decentralized mini-grids in remote areas.
As electricity demand is set to increase sharply, neither coal-fired plants nor diesel generators can provide the long-term answer. A few targeted adjustments could produce major gains. First, households should be equipped on a massive scale with clean cooking technologies such as liquefied petroleum gas, bioethanol, or high-pressure electric cookers. This remains one of the cheapest and most effective ways to accelerate development while slowing environmental destruction—using viable solutions already proven in markets like Kenya. The second major challenge is the de-risking of low-carbon projects, which must be treated as an absolute priority by international financial institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the African Development Bank. By providing guarantees for clusters of private-sector projects at a regional level, these institutions can ease financing and accelerate implementation.
The modernization of public utilities should not default to fragmentation or forced privatization. Instead, the focus must remain on improving their independence, transparency, and governance—enabling these public utilities to access the credit needed to escape their current negative fiscal spirals. This is closely linked to the integration of regional power systems and the support of electricity networks, which has now become a central concern for development finance. Finally, the phase-out of coal in South Africa remains a complex and likely protracted process given the scale of the country’s social and territorial challenges.
With 90,000 people employed in coal-related sectors in South Africa as of 2022 and a third of the total South African workforce unemployed, Europeans must temper their criticisms of governance with a realization of the social stakes. The Just Energy Transition Partnerships must be pushed forward, but concrete achievements—not just commitments—are now needed to maintain credibility. For Europe to remain a legitimate partner, it must accelerate the closure of its own coal-fired power plants while supporting Africa’s path to an electrified future.
The Extraction of Raw Materials
Mines in Africa remain a subject of both intense fascination and deep concern in early 2026, framed by claims of widespread Chinese control, reports of precarious working conditions, and persistent suspicions of corruption. Simultaneously, it has become undeniable that global energy transitions are exceptionally metal-intensive and that the African continent—richly endowed with these essential resources—is an important source of these metals for the coming decade. The Copperbelt that sits between Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo holds the second largest reserves of copper in the world and has the potential to become indispensable. Existing mining operations vary significantly in their environmental, social, and governance footprints, yet the strategic imperative for the West has never been clearer. Several critical observations define this high-stakes sector today.
The first reality is that mining remains an extremely capital-intensive and high-risk endeavor. Beyond the extraction site itself, a massive surrounding infrastructure must be developed, including stable electricity supplies, sophisticated water treatment systems, and, crucially, transport corridors for ore export such as the recently prioritized rail links to deep-water ports. Projects require years of development and generate zero cash flow during the exploration and construction phases, all while facing high political and regulatory risks in environments where mining codes and tax frameworks are often volatile.
Commodity price fluctuations add a layer of complexity that can stall even the most promising ventures. Furthermore, the issue of separation and refining remains a strategic bottleneck; these processes are energy-intensive and environmentally impactful. China has spent years specializing in this segment, maintaining a dominant position in the refining of imported raw materials—ranging from Australian iron ore to African cobalt, copper and lithium—leaving Western supply chains dangerously exposed.
A second observation is that Western actors remain relatively few in number and are often poorly equipped to compete with Chinese state-owned enterprises that benefit from direct or indirect sovereign support. However, the comparative advantage for European and American firms lies in their capacity to implement a more credible and transparent ESG agenda. By adhering to rigorous OECD or IRMA standards across environmental, social, and governance dimensions, Western mining firms can offer a quality guarantee that is increasingly attractive to African governments wary of the long-term costs of less regulated partnerships and of ensuring mining operations come with a lasting social contract. While there is no such thing as a truly “clean” mine, the industry is proving that it can meaningfully reduce its footprint. This includes the electrification of heavy equipment via local solar farms or hydro dams, the burgeoning use of green hydrogen for haulage, and improved water recycling protocols.
For Europeans, staying relevant in the race for strategic metals alongside China’s giants requires a sophisticated, three-pronged approach as we move through 2026. The first element is the uncompromising application of ESG criteria across the entire value chain, making initiatives like the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP)—renamed as FORGE—essential. This framework can create a genuine win-win for both the resource-holding nation and the importer, provided that these standards are treated as part of a gradual, collaborative process rather than an abstract set of demands imposed from Brussels. The second element is the urgent mobilization of competitive capital through export credits, loans, and subsidies. Without massive financial backing, European companies simply cannot compete in a sector defined by such staggering upfront costs.
The third element involves high-level diplomatic support and the creation of deep partnerships between European and local mining entities. To make this a reality, new financing instruments are required, potentially including dedicated European mining funds, export credit facilities, offtake agreements, guarantees or bilateral investment vehicles. This is particularly vital if the European Investment Bank remains constrained by the current green taxonomy. At present, the taxonomy’s lack of explicit support for mining—compounded by the restrictive “do no significant harm” clause—limits the EIB’s ability to act in this strategic sector. Supporting infrastructure development is now equally important as supporting mining exploration and production activities.
From a European perspective, it would be a strategic error to believe these mining projects will not move forward without Western involvement. Abandoning the sector would merely cede the ground to less scrupulous actors, depriving Africa of high-quality development partners and depriving Europe of the materials essential to its own industrial future. The challenge is to maximize the benefits of extraction for local populations while accelerating the parallel transition to the sustainable systems that will eventually succeed the mining era.
The Environment and Biodiversity
The African continent is endowed with immense environmental riches that provide exceptional climate services to the global community, including its vast oceans, resilient mangroves, and the primary forests of the Congo Basin. Unfortunately, these resources remain under constant threat from both economic desperation and illegal exploitation. Interest in nature-based solutions has grown rapidly by early 2026, notably through carbon credits on voluntary markets, which have expanded significantly from their previous valuations.
The European Union has positioned itself as a global leader in efforts to curb deforestation through the adoption of the EU Deforestation Regulation (EUDR), which introduces stricter due diligence requirements for commodities linked to forest loss. While still in the process of phased implementation, this regulation is already influencing trade dynamics, particularly for African exporters of products such as cocoa and timber.
At the same time, voluntary environmental markets are evolving, with growing interest in biodiversity-related credits alongside more established carbon markets. Within this context, several African countries are increasingly advocating for fairer compensation mechanisms—emphasizing the global value of their forest ecosystems as carbon sinks and biodiversity reservoirs, in line with broader climate frameworks such as the Paris Agreement.
Several critical findings define this sector as we move through the mid-2020s. While voluntary carbon markets are not yet fully established or consistently credible across all jurisdictions, they are undergoing a period of rigorous restructuring. These markets remain essential if global carbon neutrality is to be achieved, particularly as the biodiversity resources of the Global South require financing at a scale roughly eight times current levels. These mechanisms can be an effective means of restoring degraded ecosystems, yet it remains fundamentally unacceptable for low-priced reforestation credits to be used by Northern emitters when the legitimacy of the offset is in question.
The era of “avoided deforestation” credits based on shaky assumptions is giving way to more robust certification and control systems. Integrity and confidence are being reinforced under the aegis of the Voluntary Carbon Markets Integrity Initiative and the Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market, ensuring that demand for high-quality credits translates into actual environmental gains. Under these systems, insurance products for voluntary carbon markets will also develop to provide some protections against risks.
It is now clearly in the interest of all nations to pursue the sustainable use of their forests and biodiversity reserves, which can generate significant local employment and added value if managed with scientific rigor. While Gabon leads on forest certification and transparent taxation, many other states remain hampered by illegal deforestation driven by weak state capacity or outright complicity in criminal networks—patterns now tracked in real-time through satellite surveillance. Biodiversity-positive certificates are emerging as a more nuanced instrument than traditional carbon credits, offering a localized approach to development issues that a monolithic global market often fails to address.
Parallel to these developments, the production of sustainable, certified biofuels is expanding rapidly in certain regions, providing a new economic pathway for agricultural and forest residues. Hence, Forests and oceans must be treated as strategic assets—common public goods that are essential not only for the preservation of the planet but for a model of local development that is both responsible and mutually beneficial.
For Europeans and Africans alike, the challenge in 2026 is to strengthen public-private synergy, share best practices in monitoring and verification, and secure access to large-scale financing for sustainable land use. Acting in a credible and responsible manner to reinforce these certification mechanisms is the only way to ensure that Africa’s natural capital becomes a springboard for development rather than a resource to be exploited without return.
Outlook
North-South tensions have one great merit: they have forced Europeans and Africans into a more profound dialogue and a recognition of their obvious, if often overlooked, complementarities. Yet these complementarities can only be transformed into mutually beneficial relationships through a fundamental shift toward more balanced relations focused on development, employment, and infrastructure—all specifically intended to achieve concrete results. Europeans henceforth understand the necessity of re-engaging with a continent on which they are increasingly dependent and which offers tremendous long-term opportunities. Simultaneously, their African partners can recognize that despite the diversification of their international relations with other global powers, the European Union and its Member States remain uniquely positioned to provide the structured, long-term partnership projects the region requires.
Transparency and the rule of law remain legitimate imperatives—there is no African exception to the reality that capital is effectively de-risked through stable institutional frameworks. The ultimate challenge is to eliminate the risks associated with an inadequate financial system, yet it remains the responsibility of local governments to improve their own legal and regulatory environments. As we move through the 2026 policy cycle, particularly following the 7th EU-African Union Summit in Luanda, the transition from planning to industrial execution has become the new benchmark for success.
Following COP30 in Belém, the Baku-to-Belém Roadmap has set an ambitious target of $1.3 trillion in annual climate finance by 2035, placing immense pressure on the Just Energy Transition Partnerships to deliver. In South Africa, the JETP has moved into a critical industrial phase focused on electric vehicle value chains and mineral processing, while Senegal has finalized its long-term low-carbon strategy, aiming for 40 percent renewable capacity by 2030. These partnerships remain useful and unique instruments, but in early 2026, they must be backed by more visible, concrete achievements to maintain credibility. For both Europe and Africa, this window of opportunity must be seized now, as it could close quickly given the extent to which emerging global crises are increasingly monopolizing international agendas.
