This 33rd issue of Horizons is dedicated to what has become the defining feature of our era: the accelerating global transition toward multipolarity and its implications for the international system.
Scholars and statesmen alike are grappling with a world where the “unipolar moment” has definitively passed, replaced by a complex landscape of strategic recalibrations by major powers, assertive diplomacy from emerging middle states, and deepening fractures in global governance.
Against this volatile backdrop, Horizons is honored to feature an exclusive interview with John J. Mearsheimer, the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago and the world’s leading proponent of offensive realism.
Widely regarded as a prophet of great power politics, Mearsheimer famously predicted the inevitability of intense security competition between the United States and China, as well as the tragic collision between the West and Russia over Ukraine. In this interview with our Editor-in-Chief Vuk Jeremić, Mearsheimer dissects the structural forces driving this new multipolar order with characteristic rigor, arguing that “economic interdependence has not bought us peace; it has bought us a strategic liability.”
From his assessment that “security always trumps prosperity” to his warning that Europe “is likely to look far less like a unified political entity in the future,” his analysis offers a stark roadmap for understanding the dangerous “normalcy” of the twenty-first century.
Let’s start with the big picture. For decades, you warned that the post-Cold War “holiday from history” was a delusion and that great power competition would return with a vengeance. We now obviously survey a world defined by intense security competition in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. How does the reality of this transition compare to your predictions? In other words, is this the normalcy you expected, or has the shift been even more decisive than you anticipated?
From roughly 1992—shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union—until about 2017, we lived in a unipolar world. By definition, security competition is impossible in a unipolar system because there is only one great power. Eventually, however, it became clear that the system would shift. My argument is that this transition occurred around 2017, when China and Russia emerged as great powers, moving the world into multipolarity and bringing great power competition back to the table.
Few anticipated this instability. The prevailing belief was that peaceful relations among the major powers were permanent, regardless of the system’s structure. I disagreed completely. I argued that China’s rise would inevitably lead to intense security competition with the United States in East Asia. At the time, most dismissed this argument as foolish. Sadly, the record proves me correct.
Regarding Europe, I long argued that NATO expansion—specifically into Ukraine—was a prescription for disaster that would inevitably lead to conflict with Russia. It is important to remember that the crisis in Ukraine began in 2014, during the unipolar moment, before Russia fully resurged as a great power in 2017. Nevertheless, the result is a catastrophic war between the West and Russia. The widespread belief that we could expand NATO eastward without consequence was mistaken. On this point as well, I am sad to say I was correct.
Washington appears to have fundamentally shifted its approach under Donald Trump 2.0. The ambition to remake the world in America’s image seems to have evaporated, replaced by a sharper, more transactional focus on national interest. To what extent does this new strategy align with the realism you have long advocated, versus simply being a retreat from global leadership as some analysts lament?
It is commonplace to argue that the United States is retreating from global leadership or pursuing an isolationist foreign policy. This is nonsense.
During the unipolar moment, absent great power competition, the United States sought to remake the world in its own image through a strategy of liberal hegemony. The result was the disastrous “forever wars,” which caused the American public to turn against such interventions.
More importantly, the structure of the international system changed. With the rise of China and the resurrection of Russian power under Vladimir Putin, we moved from unipolarity to multipolarity around 2017. In a multipolar world, the United States must prioritize great power competition. Consequently, it has largely abandoned the mission of spreading liberal democracy—not only because that mission failed, but because security concerns are now paramount.
As you correctly note, Vuk, this shift in foreign policy is driven by the structural transition from unipolarity to multipolarity, as well as the recognition that liberal hegemony was a colossal failure. Instead of remaking the world in America’s image, we simply became bogged down in endless wars.
You famously argued that pushing Russia into China’s arms was a strategic blunder of the highest order. Today, this alliance appears cemented, with Moscow and Beijing deepening their military and economic cooperation. Looking at the structural forces now at play, what could peel Moscow away at this stage? Or must the West accept this bloc as a permanent feature of the new global order?
Let me start at the most general level. There are three great powers in the international system. The United States remains the most powerful state, but its peer competitor is China, not Russia. China is a close second in terms of military power, while Russia is the weakest of the three. In such a world, it makes eminently good strategic sense for the United States to align with Russia to prevent a tight Sino-Russian bloc.
However, as a result of the Ukraine war, we have driven the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. We now face a situation where Moscow and Beijing are close allies, which is not in America’s strategic interest.
I believe President Trump and his advisers understand this strategic error. Trump’s goal is to end the Ukraine war and improve relations with Moscow to peel Russia away from China. This mirrors the logic employed by Nixon and Kissinger in 1972, when they peeled China away from the Soviet Union. In that case, the United States recognized it made no sense to face two adversaries when one could be turned into an ally.
The question is whether Trump can succeed. My argument is that it is extremely unlikely in the foreseeable future. The primary obstacle is the acute Russophobia endemic to the governing classes in Europe and the United States, which makes any meaningful rapprochement politically difficult.
Furthermore, Russia has little reason to trust the West. Even if Moscow trusts Donald Trump, they know his time is limited. This is his second term; after 2028, he will leave office, and his successor may well be another Russophobe. Therefore, from Russia’s perspective, maintaining close relations with China is the rational choice. It is difficult to see how the United States rectifies this self-inflicted strategic disadvantage.
This reality places immense pressure on Europe. With the United States increasingly fixated on the Asia-Pacific, European capitals are debating strategic autonomy. Given Western Europe’s 80-year reliance on the American security umbrella, how realistic is the prospect of Europe emerging as an independent pole rather than remaining a theater for great power competition?
Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a powerful tendency to refer to Europe as if it were a single political entity—almost a state of its own. This is a fundamental mistake. Europe is comprised of a large number of sovereign states. The illusion of unity was possible only because NATO and the European Union brought these states together under the American security umbrella.
Now that the American security umbrella is weakening or potentially disappearing, the critical question is whether Europe will unite in its absence or fragment. My argument is that the opposite of unity will occur: European relations will become increasingly fractious. The American presence served as the glue that kept European states together. If you remove that security umbrella, it becomes impossible to treat Europe as a single actor.
Furthermore, one cannot underestimate the extent to which relations between Europe and Russia will remain poisonous for as far as the eye can see. The Ukraine war is an utter disaster, not only for Ukraine but for the future of European security. Even when the shooting stops and we are left with a frozen conflict, the animosity will persist.
This situation will inevitably create fractures within Europe. Some countries will want to stabilize relations with Moscow, while others will advocate for continued hostility. Russia, of course, will have powerful incentives to exploit these internal divisions and sow dissension. Therefore, Europe is likely to look far less like a unified political entity in the future, driven by two key factors: the withdrawal of American power and the enduring, divisive reality of the Russian threat.
If we take a step back from the great powers, we are witnessing assertive diplomacy from emerging middle states like Brazil, India, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, for instance. These nations seem intent on hedging rather than aligning with a single bloc. How much genuine agency do you think these states possess? In other words, can they maintain this independence—or this hedging attitude, if you will—long term? Or will the gravitational pull of the U.S. and China in particular eventually force them to choose sides?
There is no question that most states in the international system prefer to hedge rather than align directly with either the United States or China. This is especially evident in East Asia, where numerous countries maintain deep economic ties with China and wish to preserve that prosperity. Consequently, they are wary of aligning too closely with the United States. However, they also understand that if China threatens their security, they have no choice but to pivot toward Washington.
Ideally, these states seek to maximize their strategic flexibility—maintaining robust economic relations with Beijing while relying on American security guarantees. The problem, however, is that security always trumps prosperity. If survival is at risk, economic interests are subordinated to security imperatives. This is why countries like Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia have moved firmly into the American camp. In contrast, in regions like Southeast Asia where the threat perception is lower, we see significant hedging.
Brazil offers a compelling case in the Western Hemisphere. The United States enforces the Monroe Doctrine, which effectively prohibits Brazil—or any other nation in the hemisphere—from forming a military alliance with China. Brazilians understand they can maintain economic intercourse with China, but they must remain politically aligned with the United States. The historical precedent of the Cuban Missile Crisis serves as a stark reminder of the consequences when a Western Hemisphere state allies with a rival great power.
India is perhaps the most complex case. Over the past 25 years, U.S.-India relations improved dramatically, driven largely by India’s border conflict with China. However, the American response to the Ukraine war has altered this trajectory. President Trump’s decision to play hardball—imposing 50 percent tariffs on India for trading with Russia—has poisoned relations between Washington and New Delhi. India is now hedging aggressively, and if anything, leaning slightly toward China to balance American pressure. This demonstrates that India possesses significant agency, and its reaction to foolish American policies is currently detrimental to U.S. national interests.
Regarding Turkey and Saudi Arabia, I believe they will continue to lean toward the United States for the time being. Neither China nor Russia currently possesses sufficient influence to displace American hegemony in the Middle East. However, this dynamic may change. As China builds a blue-water navy and develops the capability to project power into the Persian Gulf, the strategic calculations of Riyadh and Tehran will evolve. It is entirely possible that in the future, Saudi Arabia could drift away from the United States and develop closer strategic ties with China. We must remember that the global balance of power is shifting; as China becomes increasingly powerful, its expanding power projection capabilities will fundamentally alter how countries around the world define their security interests.
Let’s move to the international organizations that we still have around, although they seem to be crumbling or struggling amidst this reinvigorated great power competition. The paralysis in the UN Security Council comes to mind, as does the fragmentation of the WTO. They seem to suggest that the post-1945 institutional architecture is crumbling under current circumstances. You have long argued that institutions merely reflect the balance of power. So, if these forums are indeed deadlocked beyond repair, what mechanisms remain to facilitate basic diplomacy between the big powers, as well as for the rest of the world?
Let me make two points. First, during the unipolar moment, there was only one great power, and that power dominated the institutions comprising the international order. We have now moved from unipolarity to multipolarity, a system with three great powers. As you noted, this fundamentally alters the politics within those institutions.
The United States no longer runs the rules-based order as it did during unipolarity; it must now compete with China and Russia within the context of the UN, the WTO, and other bodies. This situation mirrors the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States vied for influence within the United Nations. Cooperation among the great powers is becoming increasingly difficult, and the efficacy of these universal institutions will inevitably decline.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, both China and the United States are creating their own “bounded orders.” These are smaller but powerful orders designed specifically to wage security competition.
If you look back at the Cold War, the Soviets built their own bounded order, which included institutions like the Warsaw Pact and Comecon. The West, led by the United States, built its own counterpart. These were not universal international orders; they were exclusive blocs designed for competition. Today, we see the same dynamic. China is building a bounded order through the Belt and Road Initiative, BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and the AIIB—institutions that exclude the United States. Conversely, the United States is reinforcing its own bounded order. The result is that while the overarching international order weakens, these rival bounded orders are strengthening to facilitate the security competition ahead.
Let us stay with this fracturing of governance, which is very visible these days in the global economy—for instance, in markets where security concerns are overriding economic efficiency, just as you always claimed they would. It is also very evident in the decoupling of high-tech supply chains. Since high-tech is a major driver of global growth and domestic economies, this is a significant development. Does this reality validate the argument that high levels of economic interdependence are actually dangerous rather than stabilizing? And how much economic pain do you think the great powers are willing to absorb to secure their supply lines?
First, many subscribe to the liberal argument that economic interdependence causes peace. The logic is that because interdependence promotes prosperity, states will not dare start a war that would destroy that wealth. This argument is fundamentally flawed.
When I have argued in the past that the United States and China are destined for intense security competition, critics often countered that the deep economic ties between the two nations would prevent conflict. I always reminded them that there was a great deal of economic interdependence in Europe before 1914, yet World War I still occurred. Therefore, one should not count on economic factors to preserve the peace. My bottom line is that economic interdependence does not significantly drive either war or peace; it operates largely on the margins.
However, where economic interdependence matters today is in the realm of strategic leverage. The United States is dependent on China for critical materials—specifically rare earth elements and rare earth magnets—which gives Beijing significant leverage over Washington.
We saw this dynamic play out clearly when President Trump took office in January 2025. He almost immediately attempted to play hardball, threatening massive tariffs to force China to acquiesce to American demands. This approach did not last long. The Chinese made it clear that the American economy—and its defense industrial base—relies heavily on Chinese supply chains for these critical materials. They threatened to cut off access to rare earths if the United States continued down that path.
The result was that President Trump backed down. He realized that China possesses significant leverage because of this dependency. This is the true consequence of economic interdependence in the current era: it has placed the United States in a strategically disadvantageous position. We are trying to rectify this vulnerability, but untangling these supply chains is incredibly difficult. Thus, economic interdependence has not bought us peace; it has bought us a strategic liability.
History suggests that multipolar systems are prone to miscalculation. You have mentioned Europe before World War I as an example, due to the sheer complexity of the board. Scanning the global board today, where do you see the highest risk of a hot war erupting by accident? Is Taiwan the obvious primary flashpoint, as many would say, or are we overlooking other dangerous fault lines?
Let me begin with East Asia and then turn to Europe, where I believe there is huge potential for trouble moving forward.
In East Asia, there are three major flashpoints between China and the United States. The first, as you mentioned, is Taiwan. This is obviously a very dangerous situation. The Chinese are deeply committed to reclaiming Taiwan; they view it as sacred territory that rightfully belongs to China. Conversely, the United States, Japan, and other regional powers are deeply committed to ensuring Taiwan remains independent for strategic reasons. This clash of interests makes Taiwan a premier flashpoint.
However, two other flashpoints worry me greatly. One is the South China Sea. Beijing believes these waters belong to China—not as international waters, as the United States and its allies maintain, but as Chinese sovereign territory. This disagreement over control creates a real potential for conflict.
The other is the East China Sea, specifically the dispute over the islands known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. Japan currently occupies these islands and claims sovereignty, a position China vehemently rejects. Furthermore, there is a broader struggle for dominance over the East China Sea itself; China wants to control it, while Japan is determined to prevent that outcome. So, in East Asia, you have a triad of dangerous disputes: the South China Sea, the East China Sea—including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands—and Taiwan.
Now, let’s look at Europe. First, even if the fighting in Ukraine stops, we will almost certainly end up with a frozen conflict. There is always the danger that a frozen conflict can turn hot again. Therefore, Ukraine will remain a dangerous flashpoint indefinitely.
Beyond Ukraine, however, I would argue there are six other dangerous flashpoints in Europe, all closely related to the security competition between Russia and the West. These are the Arctic, the Baltic Sea, Kaliningrad, Belarus, Moldova, and the Black Sea.
Take the Arctic, for example. Seven of the eight Arctic nations are now NATO members, leaving Russia outnumbered seven to one. This imbalance creates numerous scenarios for conflict. Similarly, in each of the other cases—whether it is transit rights to Kaliningrad, instability in Moldova, or naval confrontation in the Black Sea—one can easily construct a plausible pathway to war between Russia and European states. Consequently, just as East Asia will remain a dangerous region, Europe is destined to remain a highly volatile theater of potential war for the foreseeable future.
I was relieved when you stopped at six. I was worried the Balkans might be on that list—especially since you have been such a prophet in the past regarding global events.
But let’s move on. As a leading scholar of realism, you argue that states act rationally to survive, regardless of their internal politics. Yet, the deep polarization in the United States today is undeniable. How does this internal dysfunction impact America’s ability to act as a rational balancer? Can a divided hegemon—still the strongest country in the world, as you say—effectively maintain the credibility of its security commitments abroad?
Let me begin by clarifying my theoretical position. Like almost all realists, I assume that states act rationally. However, theories are simplifications of reality; no theory can explain every case. While states routinely act rationally, there are occasions when they do not.
The important question you raise is whether the poisonous political polarization within the United States—the conflict between “Red” and “Blue” America—will cause the country to act irrationally in the international arena. I believe the answer is no, for two reasons.
First, there is remarkably little difference between the two parties regarding great power politics. Many argue that Republicans and Democrats constitute a “uni-party” when it comes to foreign policy; they think and act in very similar ways. While the domestic political divide is undoubtedly toxic—and I do not wish to minimize the trouble on the home front—this division is rarely reflected in our foreign policy. Therefore, I do not believe domestic politics will drive us toward irrationality.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, as a structural realist, I believe that the structure of the international system is largely determinative. It dictates how states act. The United States faces a serious threat from China and has a deep-seated strategic interest in containment. This reality is recognized as a strategic imperative by the foreign policy elite on both the left and the right.
This dynamic mirrors the Cold War. During that era, there was widespread agreement on the need to contain the Soviet Union, even if there were tactical disagreements on how best to achieve that goal. The same is true today regarding China. While there will always be debates over specific tactics, the overarching strategy is set by the structure of the system. Therefore, despite our internal divisions, it is highly likely that the United States will continue to behave in a strategically rational way toward China moving forward.
But is Donald Trump’s attitude toward the war in Ukraine just an aberration? The shift from the Biden administration to this government marked a dramatic change in how the U.S. approaches this crucial conflict.
I am a bit confused. Are you suggesting that after Trump, things will revert to the old bipartisan consensus on foreign policy? Are you saying that Trump will not have a lasting effect on the strategic shifts in how the U.S. deals with the world?
Look, the present U.S. policy toward Ukraine is not rational. Driving the Russians into the arms of the Chinese does not make strategic sense; there is no question about that. What President Trump is trying to do is rectify this situation. He is attempting to act in a strategically smart—and rational—way. The problem is that accomplishing this goal is extremely difficult given the intense Russophobia that pervades the West.
The United States is, in a very important sense, stuck in a rut. We are trapped in a policy that no longer makes strategic sense. This policy originated during the unipolar moment, when the goal was to spread liberal democracy and integrate Eastern and Western Europe into a single whole. That was the logic behind our approach to Ukraine, set in motion when we faced no serious great power rivals.
However, we have since transitioned from unipolarity to multipolarity, defined by intense U.S.-China competition. Yet, the United States remained stuck in a policy toward Ukraine that was obsolete. In a multipolar world, driving Russia into an alliance with China is irrational. The Biden administration acted in a non-strategic manner by exacerbating tensions with Moscow and doing little to prevent the war from breaking out in 2022. That was strategically foolish.
My point is that Trump is trying to correct this error. In my opinion, he is acting rationally. Whether he is able to fix the situation, given the domestic and international constraints, remains to be seen.
